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Abstract
Ebola is a deadly disease with no cure; there is no vaccine developed yet. Many died during the 2014 outbreak in West Africa,
and many healthcare professionals went to the virus infected area to treat the patients while placing their lives in danger. Not
every medical professional placed in the field is a fully trained specialist, and sometimes one or two under-trained doctors are in
charge of the entire clinic with some nurses and operating technicians. When unexpected outbreaks of the virus occur in the
places, the doctor(s) would encounter medical and ethical dilemmas. Should they leave or stay? In fact, this dilemma is not
confined to the Ebola pandemic but relevant to all similar cases. In this paper, three authors, a medical resident, a clinical
bioethicist, and a theoretical bioethicist respond to the dilemma. 
INTRODUCTION
Ebola is a deadly disease with no cure. After the outbreak in
West Africa in 2014, we have learned more about this
disease but there is still much more we need to learn until a
vaccine can be developed. The 2014 Ebola outbreak that
occurred in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea killed
thousands of people, and once the virus spread to the United
States and terrified the US population. The Ebola-infected
developing countries lacked the resources to provide care for
their citizens and to protect those uninfected. Even the
United States failed in many ways to address this deadly
disease. Universal standard precautions are known to help
prevent most transmissions through exposure to blood and
body fluids, but these precautions demand necessary
equipment that was not available in these developing
nations. Personal protective equipment to avoid direct
contact with blood and body fluids is expensive, and
environmental controls were not even developed, let alone
implemented. Accordingly, healthcare professionals treating
these infected patients in these developing countries were
placing their lives in danger. Then, the medical ethical
question is: “Should they be ready to place themselves in
harm’s way?”
Many healthcare professionals treated infected Ebola
patients and many of them died due to a lack of proper
personal protective equipment. We also know that not all
medical professionals placed in the field are fully trained
specialists. Plus, unexpected outbreaks of the virus occur in
the places where no trained personnel are present. Then, the
question is, “What should the under-trained healthcare
workers do when they encounter the unexpected outbreak,
especially when the situation is medically dire, e.g., not
enough personal protective equipment?” Is it ethically
justifiable for them to abandon the infected patients and
leave? This paper is a composite of ethical analytic
responses to such a case.
Suppose that a second year medical resident married with
two children whom we shall call “Dr. A” volunteered to
spend a month in Sierra Leone for a rotation in international
public health medicine. In a clinic with one staff physician,
ten nurses, and some other operating staff members, he finds
himself as the one in charge of the clinic by replacing the
staff physician. Then, the Ebola virus suddenly breaks out
panicking everyone in the clinic and Dr. A is unable to
contact the staff physician enjoying his vacation 500 miles
away. Dr. A remembers the Hippocratic Oath he took that he
would hold a special medical obligation for those infirm.
However, the dire circumstance he encounters places him in
the ethical dilemma, whether he should stay with the
infected patients or leave.
Authors of this paper make a three-part analytic commentary
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on this case. The first section, “From the Perspective of a
Medical Professional” is a response from a third-year
medical resident. The following section, “From the
Perspective of a Clinical Bioethicist,” is the view of a
seasoned clinical bioethicist and theologian. Last, “From the
Perspective of a Theoretical Ethicist,” is opined by a
philosopher whose primary research interest is in theories of
medical ethics.   
THE CASE
As a second year medical resident at Mercy Catholic
Medical Center, Dr. A decided to do a one-month rotation in
international public health medicine in the Sierra Leone. Dr.
A is married with two small children but his family agrees
that this rotation would help his long-term career goals. Dr.
A was assigned to a remote clinic in central Sierra Leone.
The clinic had a staff of one physician, ten nurses, fifteen
medical technicians and twenty auxiliary staff members. The
clinic serves as a mini-hospital with 35 in-patient beds. The
staff physician was very grateful to have Dr. A for a month
so he could take a much needed vacation. In the second
week at the clinic Dr. A had a patient present with fever,
headache, joint and muscle aches, sore throat, and weakness,
followed by diarrhea, vomiting, and stomach pain. A rash,
red eyes, hiccups and internal and external bleeding was
seen in the patient. Immediately the staff became quite
concerned and informed Dr. A that the patient appeared to
have the Ebola virus. Dr. A was unfamiliar with the Ebola
virus and began doing an immediate search of the symptoms
and the condition. He learned the following:
a. Infections with Ebola virus are acute. There is no carrier
state. Because the natural reservoir of the virus is unknown,
the manner in which the virus first appears in a human at the
start of an outbreak has not been determined. However,
researchers have hypothesized that the first patient becomes
infected through contact with an infected animal.
b. After the first patient in an outbreak setting is infected, the
virus can be transmitted in several ways. People can be
exposed to Ebola virus from direct contact with the blood
and/or secretions of an infected person. Thus, the virus is
often spread through families and friends because they come
in close contact with such secretions when caring for
infected persons. People can also be exposed to Ebola virus
through contact with objects, such as needles, that have been
contaminated with infected secretions.
c. Nosocomial transmission refers to the spread of a disease
within a health-care setting, such as a clinic or hospital. It
occurs frequently during Ebola hemorrhagic fever (Ebola
HF) outbreaks. It includes both types of transmission
described above. In African health-care facilities, patients
are often cared for without the use of a mask, gown, or
gloves. Exposure to the virus has occurred when health care
workers treated individuals with Ebola HF without wearing
these types of protective clothing. In addition, when needles
or syringes are used, they may not be of the disposable type,
or may not have been sterilized, but only rinsed before
reinsertion into multi-use vials of medicine. If needles or
syringes become contaminated with the virus and are then
reused, numerous people can become infected.
Dr. A learned that there is no standard treatment for Ebola
HF. Patients receive supportive therapy. This consists of
balancing the patient’s fluids and electrolytes, maintaining
their oxygen status and blood pressure, and treating them for
any complicating infections. 90% of all infected patients die.
The staff members at the clinic became very alarmed and
were fearful that they would become infected. Many refused
to treat the patient for fear of becoming infected. Within 48
hours there were 15 patients now infected with the Ebola
Virus. Dr. A was unable to contact the staff physician who
was 500 miles away and did his best to notify authorities of
the outbreak. Within 72 hours one of the staff nurses became
infected and the majority of the staff was in the process of
abandoning the clinic. Dr. A contacted his colleagues back
in the States and many advised him to leave the DRC
immediately for fear of becoming infected with the result
being death.
Dr. A was now in an ethical and medical dilemma. He had
taken the Hippocratic Oath that states “I will remember that I
remain a member of society, with special obligations to all
my fellow human beings, those sound of mind and body as
well as the infirm.”1 He was also the only medical physician
available and to leave under these conditions could be
considered patient abandonment. However, there is no cure
for the Ebola virus, Dr. A is not adequately trained in
infectious diseases, and the odds seem very high that if he
stays he will become infected and there is a high probability
that he could die. Dr. A also has his family to consider. The
clinic has now been isolated and only patients with the Ebola
virus are in the clinic. The staff is running low on
medications and the World Health Organization (WHO) has
been notified but the staff is unsure when they will or if they
will arrive to assist them. The local villagers have abandoned
the village and the staff is decreasing in number. To date
they have 30 patients and there have been 10 deaths. If you
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were Dr. A, what would you do in this situation? Should the
staff be placed in medical jeopardy or removed for their own
safety?
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A MEDICAL
PROFESSIONAL
Medical Investigation. A recommendation of what Dr. A
should do from a medical professional’s perspective should
be preceded by an understanding of the medical facts about
the Ebola virus. The Ebola is an RNA virus which is a
member of the family Filoviridae. It was previously known
as a hemorrhagic fever virus due to the clinical conditions it
caused; however, it is now known as Ebola virus disease.2,3
The Ebola virus is divided into five species (Zaire, Sudan,
Ivory Coast, Bundibugyo, and Reston)4 the first four of
which can cause disease in humans. According to records, its
outbreaks occurred in Democratic Republic of the Congo in
1995, Uganda in 2000, and West Africa in 2014-2015.5 And
approximately 28,500 suspected and laboratory-confirmed
cases attributed to the Ebola were filed, among which there
were more than 11,000 deaths.6 In this particular case, 60%
of the 881 infected healthcare workers died.7 In the U.S., the
first Ebola case was reported in September 2014 in Dallas,
Texas, and the patient died.8
Data has suggested that bats are possible viral reservoirs of
the Ebola virus in Africa.9 A human person can be infected
through contact with meat or body fluids of an infected
animal. After the person is infected, the virus spreads
through direct contact via any type of body fluid or even
skin contact. Data from World Health Organization (WHO)
suggests that the most infectious body fluids include blood,
feces, and vomitus, although the virus has been detected in
all other body fluids as well, including urine, saliva, sweat,
semen/vaginal fluid, tears, and breast milk.10 Follow-up
studies done on survivors from previous outbreaks show that
the infectious virus can be present in body fluids though not
detected in blood, which makes it possible that the
transmission of the virus occurs many months before we
even know it.11
The Ebola’s incubation period varies between two to 21
days.12 Affecting many systems of human body, the virus’
initial symptoms are nonspecific and include fever, chills,
headache, vomiting, diarrhea and fatigue. And within a week
of illness a diffuse nonpruritic, erythematous rash can
develop. The gastrointestinal symptoms generally
predominate and commonly lead to vomiting and diarrhea
which may lead to hypovolemic shock. Some infected
patients develop minor bleeding such as petechiae, mucosal
bleeding, and blood in the stools; however, gross bleeding is
only seen at the terminal stage of the illness.13 Patients can
also develop an array of neurological symptoms including
altered mental status, stiff neck, seizures, blurred vision,
photophobia, vision loss.14 Laboratory abnormalities include
leukopenia, thrombocytopenia, abnormal hematocrit,
transaminitis, elevated PT/INR, increased BUN/creatinine,
and multiple electrolyte disturbances.15 Complications such
as septic and hypovolemic shock, acute kidney failure,
respiratory failure, DIC, and liver failure can occur, which
usually results in death of these patients within two weeks.
For the Ebola survivors, the recuperative period persists
more than two years while causing many chronic conditions
and disabilities such as arthralgias, ocular symptoms, skin
and hair loss, and failure to thrive.16,17
Diagnosis largely depends on appropriate triage of the
patient determined by the concerning signs and symptoms,
level of risk of exposure, and time of exposure. Center for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) defines the level of
risk into four stages: high risk, some risk, low risk, and no
identifiable risk.18 And based on the categories, the patients
are divided into symptomatic or asymptomatic. Clinical
judgment and circumstantial evidence is of utmost
importance.  If a patient has travelled to an infected area
within 21 days of the onset of nonspecific symptoms or had
contact with a person diagnosed with Ebola, the index of
suspicion should be high. A laboratory diagnosis of Ebola is
made by detection of viral antigens or RNA in body fluid.
Viral RNA can be detected within three days of the
symptom’s onset. A reverse-transcription polymerase chain
reaction for the Ebola virus infection should be done only in
patients who have symptoms concerning for the Ebola, with
any possible risk of exposure.19,20
Based on the guidelines from the WHO and CDC, those
suspected to have Ebola infection should be isolated
immediately. The use of personal protective equipment,
infection control precautions, and involvement of infection
control staff should be initiated promptly by all healthcare
workers.21 There are no approved medications for the
treatment or for post-exposure prophylaxis of Ebola virus
infection. Many experimental anti-viral agents were used in
the outbreaks; however, their efficacy is not clearly
understood and still being studied. And there are no
approved vaccines to prevent the virus yet. Therefore, the
mainstay of treatment for Ebola virus infection is supportive
care.
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The major focus of the healthcare professions is to provide
adequate fluid resuscitation so that hypovolemic shock and
electrolyte abnormalities may be prevented due to excessive
GI losses. Other types of supportive care known to be
beneficial include anti-emetic, anti-diarrheal, anti-pyretic,
analgesic, anti-epileptic medications and blood products.
Mechanical ventilation for respiratory support may be
required if pulmonary edema or acute lung injury ensue.
Also, empiric antimicrobials, parenteral nutritional support,
and renal replacement therapy may be required in later
stages.
Other Term of Hippocratic Oath. Now, what should or
would Dr. A do? First of all, Dr. A is not an infectious
disease specialist, a trained emergency medical physician, or
a critical care physician who will be able to deal with
patients of such acuity. He is a medical resident. While he
was in the clinic, within 48 hours 15 patients got infected
with the Ebola virus and in 72 hours one of the staff nurses
became infected as well. This clearly shows that Dr. A is
unable to control the situation or protect his staff and other
patients, since he does not have the required skills. Dr. A
may refer to his vow to the Hippocratic Oath which demands
that he has special obligations to care for his fellow human
beings who are ill. However, he should be reminded of the
part of the Hippocratic Oath that states, “I will not be
ashamed to say ‘I know not,’ nor will I fail to call in my
colleagues when the skills of another are needed for a
patient's recovery.”22 Although he is the only physician
available in the area, Dr. A is not qualified to handle this
particular disease. Perhaps due to lack of his knowledge and
training, Dr. A did not immediately isolate the initial
infected patient, particularly among his staff members, the
fact of which is contributed to the virus’ further spread.
Besides, the clinic is already short on medications for
supportive care, does not have personal protective
equipment, and has minimal infection control methods
available at this time. Due to the nature of the disease shown
above and to its time sensitivity, it is best that Dr. A should
leave immediately and be replaced with a seasoned
physician who is trained to handle the situation. He should
contact the authorities and request for the current patients to
be transferred from this community care center to a better
equipped Ebola treatment center; many of which may have
been established in areas across West Africa.
Harm-Benefit Analysis. In addition, when risks are high
and treatment benefits low, physicians should make their
own decisions without being obligated by “duty.” All
physicians have a right to their own safety first, because
healthcare providers cannot be useful if they turn into
patients themselves. It is important to protect themselves
first to be able to help others. Putting one’s own life at risk,
when the physician is not contributing positively, is not
advisable. Thus, Dr. A should leave immediately. Also, each
staff member should be asked to decide whether they would
like to stay or leave for their own safety.
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A CLINICAL
BIOETHICIST
Respect for Person. From the perspective of a Clinical
bioethicist. To examine this case from a practical-clinical
ethical perspective, the ethical principles of respect for
person’s life, beneficence/nonmaleficence, and justice are
invoked. First, the respect for person’s life (“respect for
person” henceforth) refers to the right of a person to exercise
self-determination and to be treated with dignity and respect.
And the principle of respect for person demands two
separate moral requirements: the requirement to
acknowledge autonomy and the requirement to protect those
with diminished autonomy.
Being a medical resident, Dr. A is not fully trained in
infectious diseases. Also, he is not being supervised by an
attending physician, at the moment, because the attending
physician is away on a break. In addition, he seems to
exhibit impediments to his will and intellect which include
fear, vincible and invincible ignorance, coercion, etc. He
does not have the proper personal protective equipment to
protect himself and his medical staff from potential exposure
to blood and body fluids. That being so, though no one can
say that Dr. A had the “right” to protect his own health and
life, it might be argued that respect for person would dictate
that he should do everything possible to protect his health
and life and thus that he should leave immediately.
However, the problem is that his patients have diminished
autonomy and are the most vulnerable of people. They have
contracted a deadly disease that is 90% fatal. They are
suffering without supportive therapies, and the medical
resident is the only trained medical physician at the clinic.
To leave these infected patients would be a form of
abandonment and is a clear violation of a vulnerable person.
Therefore, to leave violates a vulnerable person’s human
rights and the basic dignity and respect that every person
deserves, thereby making it the violation of the principle of
respect for person.
Beneficence/Non-maleficence. The principle of beneficence
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involves the obligation to prevent, remove, or minimize
harm and risk to others and to promote and enhance their
good. Beneficence includes nonmaleficence, which prohibits
the infliction of harm, injury, or death upon others. In
medical ethics this principle has been closely associated with
the maxim primum non nocere (“Above all, do no harm”).
To abandon these vulnerable patients at a time when many
are near death because the physician fears he might become
infected is neither minimizing risks and harms nor
promoting or enhancing the good. In the first place, there is a
high probability that Dr. A himself may already be infected.
Second, even if he does leave the clinic and heads to the
capital, it is very unlikely that he will be able to return home.
He would need to be evaluated and even be quarantined for
an extended period of time. The direct intention of leaving
the clinic without a physician will impact the patients in the
clinic and will directly impact any further patients who are
brought to the clinic in the following days and weeks. This
would be a direct infliction of harm and injury on the
patients in the clinic and further patients brought to the
clinic. Failure to recognize this fact is a failure not only of
the test of beneficence; it may also be a failure of the test of
nonmaleficence.
Justice. The principle of justice recognizes that each person
should be “given his or her due” which include treating
people fairly and equitably. Dr. A could argue that leaving
the clinic immediately would possibly save his life and thus
he would have the potential to help many patients in the
future as a physician. Besides, left alone at the clinic
unsupervised and not being adequately trained to handle this
outbreak of Ebola, he would argue that he has not been
treated fairly and equitably. He may argue as well that he has
a responsibility for his own life and a responsibility to his
immediate family. Accordingly, to stay and risk his life,
under the present circumstances, would be neither fair nor
equitable.
However, seeking justice in the way of considering a
physician’s own life and wellbeing against those of the
patients the physician cares for is not the type of ethical
reasoning that most ethicists would accept. Nevertheless,
given the circumstances, it is possible to conceive the justice
Dr. A may appeal to here as a concern of “giving him his
due.” But saying that justice is giving each person what he or
she deserves and that this is what Dr. A demands does not
help us much understand the concrete meanings of justice
involved here.23 How do we determine what Dr. A deserves?
What criteria should we use to determine what is due to Dr.
A? To answer these questions seems to require an agreement
on the moral identity of a medical profession at the
fundamental level, which cannot be treated here. Thus, while
admitting that Dr. A can resort to justice in accordance with
his desert, we will not proceed to elaborate its content.
Slippery Slope. There is also a concern for the slippery
slope. In a slippery slope argument, a course of action is
rejected because, with little or no evidence, one insists that it
will lead to a chain reaction resulting in an undesirable end
or ends. If Dr. A is permitted to abandon his patients because
of fear that he might contract this deadly disease, what will
stop physicians from abandoning their patients when other
epidemics break out in the future? We cannot forget
HIV/AIDS, Bird Flu, SARS, Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome, Zika, etc., Once a precedent is established, it
logically follows that it can become applicable to other
related situations.
Balancing. Physicians have an ethical obligation to use their
knowledge of medicine and their medical skills fairly and to
distribute them equitably. Failure to do so is ethically
irresponsible and morally objectionable. To compromise the
basic ethical foundations upon which medicine stands is
destructive not only for the medical resident and his patients
at the clinic but to society as a whole. To decide what Dr. A
should do ethically in this situation, we must balance Dr. A’s
best interest as a physician (possible justice) with the best
interest of his patients and society as a whole (respect for
person and beneficence/non-maleficence) and its relevant
moral concern (slippery slope) against the backdrop of the
given context: the medical knowledge we have about the
Ebola virus, the lack of another physician, the lack of
protective medical equipment against Ebola, the high
possibility that Dr. A may already be infected and may not
be able to return home, the fact that intentionally abandoning
his patients would cause immediate death to those in the
clinic and that he would not be available to assist others
brought to the clinic for medical care, etc. And it seems clear
that the medical resident must remain at the clinic and take
care of his patients, while continuing to contact trained
medical professionals at the CDC and WHO to let them
aware of the situation and to request more medical personnel
and protective medical equipment.
FROM THE PERPSECTIVE OF A THEORETICAL
ETHICIST
The Principle of Special Medical Obligation [PSMO].
The general moral principle which applies to our case is the
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Hippocratic moral oath that Dr. A took. By taking the vow,
he voluntarily forfeited the right to the minimal morality of
an ordinary citizen and bound himself as a doctor to a more
stringent kind of medical morality, one term of which says:
“I will remember that I remain a member of society, with
special obligations to all my fellow human beings, those
sound of mind and body as well as the infirm.” Dr. A is also
bound to another term of the oath, “I will not be ashamed to
say ‘I know not,’ nor will I fail to call in my colleagues
when the skills of another are needed for a patient's
recovery.” However, the two terms do not seem to contradict
with each other, nor do they suggest that Dr. A should leave
or stay in this particular situation. Whereas the former term
enjoins that doctors should hold a special medical obligation
both to those who are sound and infirm, the latter calls for
professional humility. To be precise, the latter is not relevant
in our context because exercising professional humility is
what Dr. A can do with or without leaving the clinic. In
other words, Dr. A can inform the trained medical
professionals at CDC and WHO that he is not capable of
handling the situation because of his lack of knowledge and
training, regardless of change of his physical location.  On
the other hand, it is not entirely clear if the former term
dictates that Dr. A should stay or leave. Thus, this will be the
focus of our investigation in the following.
Let us say that the former term of the oath is the ethical
principle of special medical obligation (PSMO). In an
ordinary clinical medical setting, not treating a patient
intentionally or out of negligence is the violation of the
PSMO, which in turn is the violation of its narrower or
specified principles, that is, the principles of
beneficence/non-maleficence and of respect for person. And
it is possible to say that the same moral reasoning applies to
our case. Since healthy people do not need doctors, the
PSMO that apply both to those sound and infirm is de facto
relevant only to the sick. Therefore, Dr. A has a special
obligation to care for the infected and thus should not leave
the clinic.
Nevertheless, it is still not clear that Dr. A’s case can be
treated in this manner. Given that this is a dire circumstance
in which the physician’s own life is in danger (let alone that
the situation may be the case of practical futility), it can be
said that Dr. A should not leave only when the PSMO’s
moral binding power extends to the point that doctors should
be ready to risk their own lives to care for the sick. To
examine this, we should move to the understanding of the
concept of supererogation.
Supererogation. Supererogation refers to the act that goes
beyond what is considered a call for ordinary moral duty.
Thus, supererogation is typically called the “morality of
saints or heroes” though the agents of supererogatory acts
may not think of their deeds as saintly or heroic. Given now
that risking physicians’ own lives to care for the infected
patients in the case of practical futility is a supererogatory
act, the question is whether or not the PSMO includes the
moral binding force of supererogation, to say that Dr. A
should stay.
Traditionally, supererogation was discussed as a theological
subject. And in the sixteenth century Europe, the Roman
Catholic doctrine of supererogation, opera supererogationis,
aroused a heated theological debate between the Roman
Catholic theologians and the Protestant reformers.24 In
accordance with the tradition left by the Early Church
Fathers, the Catholics believed that supererogation did exist
as they form the two evangelical counsels of the New
Testament (i.e., chastity as celibate lifestyle and obedience
as monastic vows) as supererogatory while considering
ordinary Christian life (e.g., taking a wife, owning private
properties, etc.) no sin.25 Meanwhile, the Protestant
Reformers, Luther, Calvin, Anglican theologians, fiercely
opposed opera supererogationis because they did not believe
the theory of super-meritorious acts. They argue that no
human beings, not even saints, can go beyond what ordinary
morality is required. In other words, there cannot be morality
beyond morality. In a fundamental level, the Protestant
opposition to supererogation has to do fundamentally with
their doctrine of soteriology. In Protestantism, salvation is
not by works but by Grace alone, so it is absurd to focus on
what “ethical works” human beings can do.26
Three Versions of Supererogationism. The two theological
views on supererogation are further developed in
contemporary analytic philosophy. The philosophers like
David Heyd (1982) and J. O. Urmson (1988) are known to
be primary figures who initiated the philosophical discussion
of supererogation. We introduce here three philosophical
positions on supererogation by following Heyd’s category:
Anti-supererogationism, unqualified supererogationism, and
qualified supererogationism. Anti-supererogationists, whose
view is aligned with that of the Protestant theologians, claim
that there is no such thing as supererogatory morality
because there cannot be greater or lesser morality. The
essence of morality is absolute and universal. And
Emmanuel Kant’s deontological ethics nicely fits in with
this idea; it is no wonder that Kant himself was a Lutheran.27
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On the other hand, unqualified supererogationists
acknowledge the existence of two distinct moralities: one is
ordinary and the other, supererogatory. Supererogatory acts,
unlike ordinary moral acts, are “characterized as purely
voluntary, optional, and in a sense arbitrary, that is, not
determined by universal standards or rules.”28 Underlying
this idea is the view that “human beings are autonomous
individuals having a basic right . . . [t]heir duty is limited
and moral.”29
However, the most serious problem with both anti-
supererogationism and unqualified supererogationism which
is relevant to our case (let alone other theoretical problems)
is the difficulty of finding criteria whereby actual cases can
be judged to be morally obligatory, recommended, or not.
From the standpoint of anti-supererogationism,
supererogation cannot be invoked when the PSMO applies
because there is no such thing as supererogation. Then, for
example, anti-supererogationists may argue that, under the
binding power of one and the only morality, the PSMO
dictates that Doctor A should stay to treat the dying patients.
Doctor A does not become a hero or saint to act in obedience
to the vow to the PSMO he made. It is just the demand of
ordinary morality; otherwise, he should not have become a
medical doctor. However, anti-supererogationists can
produce the opposite moral verdict by appeal to the same
morality. They can support Doctor A’s withdrawal by saying
that there is no such morality that demands for Doctor A to
risk his own life. The PSMO does not demand such an act.
The only morality that applies to this case, they may say, is
the negative Golden Rule: “Do not do unto others what you
do not want others to do unto you.” Since no one wishes to
risk one’s own life, others cannot expect Doctor A to stay to
risk his own life in the name of morality.
The same type of problem exists in unqualified
supererogationism. It is not only that unqualified
supererogationism cannot propose whether the PSMO
should include the sense of supererogation or not, but also
that, even if it does, its two-tier structure itself does not
produce practical guidelines to evaluate whether Doctor A’s
decision to stay can be viewed supererogatory or not.
Suppose that the PSMO demands supererogation. Given that
a supererogatory act is praiseworthy but not obligatory,
Doctor A’s decision to stay may be viewed either as a
praiseworthy, supererogatory act; or to fall into the class of
foolhardy and irresponsible acts, the act to risking his own
life and putting his family in the expected misery. One can
say that Dr. A may have already been infected and there is a
high chance that he may not be able to return home for an
extended period of time even if he survives and thus that Dr.
A’s decision to stay cannot be a foolhardy act. However, this
view makes the medical resident’s act look as if his decision
to stay were out of despair or “nothing-to-lose” attitude,
thereby making his act not entirely praiseworthy. After all,
unqualified supererogationism, problematically, makes its
criteria widely open to the interpretations of those who
evaluate the act.
The last category is qualified supererogationism. This
position seems to offer the most reasonable responses to the
moral struggle that Doctor A is facing. Conceiving
supererogatory acts to exist in unqualified sense is
problematic for the aforementioned reason. Completely
denying the existence and value of supererogatory action
does not fit with most people’s intuition. Thus,
supererogation should exist. Qualified supererogationism is
an attempt to account for its legitimacy without the problem
of unqualified supererogationism by distinguishing between
different kinds of moral duties and specifying conditions and
limits of the application of the duties. Since this is the most
popular view of supererogationism found in academic
literature, there are many variations of it. The most popular
and traditional kind of qualified supererogationism is found
in the Catholic theological tradition’s doctrine of opera
supererogationis.30 As alluded above, this view classifies
people into those who can take up saintly morality and those
for ordinary morality. These different groups of people are
sometimes justified to hold different “vocations.” The
qualified supererogationism says that, in a fundamental
level, supererogatory morality is required. However, for the
vast majority of people, due to their frail moral nature, the
supererogatory moral obligation is excused.  On the other
hand, only for those blessed with the strength of character
and virtue, supererogatory morality is required.
Critics may say that the major problem of this view is that it
is “subjectivist” in the sense that the individual decides what
to do. There cannot be an objective standard to say that a
certain action is supererogatory and required for a certain
group of people. Nevertheless, this problem is not the same
kind of systemic ambiguity problem that anti-
supererogationism and unqualified supererogationism hold.
While the first two theories cannot produce a practical moral
verdict about an actual case both in the first-person and
third-person levels, qualified supererogationism demands
that the decision is made primarily from the first-person
view. Therefore, there is no ambiguity within its system.
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Qualified supererogationism does not suggest that the PSMO
should include the supererogatory component or not.
However, this is not a theoretical vice but merit, for it is
unnecessary for this view to discuss its possible theoretical
underpinnings vis-a-via the PSMO. The theory says that an
individual moral agent, whether the agent is a medical doctor
or not, decides how much he or she can do based on the
agent’s own moral capacity. In our case, Dr. A should reason
whether he is called to the saintly duty to stay with the dying
patients though it may mean to risk his own life. He may
interpret that the PSMO he is committed to the essential part
of his God-given vocation as a medical doctor. He may
understand that the situation he is facing now is practically
futile; however, leaving the patients is abandoning them and
thus forsaking the oath he took. He may ponder how his wife
and children may suffer in case he could not make it
through. However, he may believe in miracles and think to
himself that the Almighty can take better care of them than
he might. Thus, it is better for me to die here than to live
unfaithfully with the broken vow, he may conclude.
The critics of qualified supererogationism may say that Dr.
A’s decision cannot be justified because, given that the
situation is the case of practical futility, his decision is
irrational. Thus, Dr. A’s decision to stay cannot be justified
in terms of any type of morality. However, this criticism
opens a controversial, perennial debate that not many
philosophers and theologians wish to engage in. When the
agent’s moral decision is criticized on the basis of a rational
standard, does the philosophical proof of burden is upon the
critics, such as “Does the criticism presuppose that morality
is part of rationality just like the Kantian deontological
scheme?” “If morality should be sanctioned by rationality,
then what are the criteria of rationality that make morality,
moral?”, etc.31
Qualified supererogationism of the traditional kind seems
the most plausible theory of supererogationism. However,
being a subjectivist ethical view, qualified
supererogationism makes the third-party recommendation
not significant or even relevant, though this cannot be a
theoretical or practical problem. Accordingly, we, as medical
professionals committed to the same vow and as Dr. A’s
(imaginary) colleagues who are genuinely concerned about
his and his families’ wellbeing, may say like this, “Hey Doc,
you should leave immediately. But, if you decided to stay to
care for the dying patients, it would really be admirable.”
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